International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Spillovers by Wolfgang Keller
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









Parts of this paper draw on my ongoing work with Stephen R. Yeaple, whom I thank for his many
insights. I also thank Beata Javorcik and Jim Tybout for conversations, Ben Li for comments, and
Will Olney for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Wolfgang Keller. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Spillovers
Wolfgang Keller




This paper examines how international flows of technological knowledge affect economic performance
across industries and firms in different countries. Motivated by the large share of the world's technology
investments made by firms that are active across borders, we focus on international trade and multinational
enterprise activity as conduits for technological externalities, or spillovers. In addition to reviewing
the recent empirical research on technology spillovers, the discussion is guided by a new model of
foreign direct investment, trade, and endogenous technology transfer. We find evidence for technology
spillovers through international trade and the activity of multinational enterprises. The analysis also








The international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) activity of ￿rms is a natural
starting point for thinking about the international di⁄usion of technology. First of all, multi-
national ￿rms￿ those whose operations span several countries￿ are among the most important
technology producers in the world. In the year 1999, for example, 83% of all manufacturing
R&D in the United States was conducted by parent companies of U.S. multinationals (NSF
2005). Multinational parents will typically want to transfer the technology they have created
to their a¢ liates abroad.1 Second, ￿rms that engage in international trade and FDI tend to
larger and more productive than ￿rms that only operate domestically. Thus, the latter may
be able to raise their productivity by interacting with foreign ￿rms. Moreover, trade and
FDI are also strongly related. In the U.S. today, for example, multinational ￿rms account
for about 40% of all trade.
Why does the international di⁄usion of technology matter? Productivity di⁄erences
explain a large part of the variation in incomes across countries, and technology plays the
key role in determining productivity.2 For most countries, foreign sources of technology
are estimated to account for 90% or more of domestic productivity growth. Although the
contribution of India, China, and a number of other countries is rising, most of the world￿ s
technology creation occurs in only a handful of rich countries.3 The pattern of worldwide
1In fact, a cornerstone of the theory of multinational ￿rms holds that imperfections in the market for
technological knowledge is a key reason why certain transfers are internalized within the ￿rm, between a
multinational parent and its a¢ liate.
2See Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine (2001).
3The largest seven industrialized countries accounted for about 84% of the world￿ s research and develop-
ment (R&D) spending in 1995, for example; their share in world GDP was only 64%.
2technical change is thus determined in large part by international technology di⁄usion.
International technology di⁄usion a⁄ects both the distribution and the growth of world
incomes. First, whether countries￿incomes converge over time or not turns on whether
technology di⁄usion is global or local.4 A better understanding of technology di⁄usion
therefore provides insights on the likelihood that certain less developed countries will catch-
up to rich countries. Second, strong cross-country di⁄usion of technology will generally raise
the rate at which the world￿ s technology frontier advances, so technology di⁄usion has not
only distributional but also e¢ ciency implications.5
The di⁄usion of technology involves both market transactions and externalities. To
obtain information on the former is fairly straightforward. For instance, ￿rms make royalty
payments for their use of patents, licenses, and copyrights, and this is recorded for many
countries in the international services balance (e.g., OECD 2003). Many researchers believe
that international technology di⁄usion occurs not only through market transactions but
also, and possibly more so through externalities.6 These externalities are called technology
spillovers. One reason is that technology is not fully codi￿able. This makes, ￿rst of all,
communication about the technological knowledge di¢ cult. It may also mean that it is
impossible to write contracts that cover every contingency, which may lead to a hold-up
problem if the services provided by the supplier are speci￿c. Another reason for market
failure in the market for technology is asymmetric information: the buyer does not know the
4See Grossman and Helpman (1991), Howitt (2000).
5See, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 12).
6For example, technology externalities provided by the US to other countries are an order of magnitude
larger than US technology licensing receipts. See the US balance of payments data on trade in services, and
McNeil and Fraumeni (2005) on spillovers.
3true e¢ ciency of the technology, while the seller cannot commit to truthful claims about it.
Even though much of the international transfer of technology may thus not occur through
market transactions, it will typically be associated with observable international activity. I
call this activity potential channels for international technology spillovers. Among the most
frequently mentioned channels are international trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
and I will present the evidence on these. A major theme will be that it is crucial to distinguish
spillovers from technology di⁄usion, and, more generally, from other factors that in￿ uence
￿rm productivity.7
To preview the results, there is evidence that imports are a signi￿cant channel of tech-
nology di⁄usion. The evidence for bene￿ts associated with exporting is generally weaker,
although a number of recent studies indicate that also exporting activity may transmit tech-
nological knowledge. The importance of FDI has long been emphasized in the case study
literature, and recently that evidence has been complemented by some econometric ￿ndings.
At the same time, despite the global reach of computer programs there is no indication that
a global pool of technology yet exists. The localized character of technology suggests that
an important component of it is tacit in nature, which may require face-to-face interaction.
Although the relative importance of international technology di⁄usion appears to be increas-
ing along with higher levels of economic integration, international di⁄usion of technology is
neither inevitable nor automatic. Domestic technology investments are necessary.8
7I use the term international technology di⁄usion when referring to the movement of technological knowl-
edge from ￿rms in one to ￿rms in other countries. This di⁄usion consists of arms-length market transactions
and externalities, or international technology spillovers. Technology di⁄usion is one factor, but not the only
one, that can a⁄ect productivity. In this chapter, the terms di⁄usion and transfer are used synonymously,
even though the latter may suggest a more intentional approach than the former.
8Another channel, outside the scope of this chapter, is technology di⁄usion through international migra-
4This chapter provides more details on these issues. The following section starts out
by introducing a conceptual framework for analyzing trade, FDI, and technology di⁄usion.
Section 3 discusses the available data and various approaches to do empirical work on in-
ternational technology di⁄usion. The following three sections review the empirical evidence.
Section 4 considers the relationship of international technology di⁄usion and geographic dis-
tance, while section 5 and 6 look at FDI and international trade, respectively. A concluding
discussion is provided in section 7.
2 A Model of Trade, FDI, and International Technol-
ogy Transfer
Economists have studied the relation of trade, FDI, and technology di⁄usion using a number
of di⁄erent approaches. To highlight their respective advantages and disadvantages, this sec-
tion introduces a model that can illustrate the major issues. For the model of international
technology di⁄usion to be useful for thinking about these issues, it needs to satisfy two condi-
tions. First, there should be an explicit treatment of technology in the sense of information,
or knowledge required for production. This is because it is impossible to understand inter-
national technology transfer without recognizing that it requires knowledge transfer from
one to another human being. Second, the ￿rms in our model should also be able to engage
in FDI and international trade. The latter point is relatively easy to address, whereas the
former is relatively di¢ cult, and in consequence, there are few attempts to formally model
tion and networks; for recent contributions, see Agrawal and Oettl (2008), Kerr (2008), and Singh (2005).
5technology as knowledge.9 To keep things simple, in the following framework all technology
transfer is internalized by the ￿rms. Further below the model will then be used to discuss
which activities are particularly prone to generating externalities. The following discussion
follows Keller and Yeaple (2008, 2009a), starting with an overview.
Overview In this world, each country has a large number of ￿rms that can each produce a
unique variety of a di⁄erentiated ￿nal good. A ￿rm sells its ￿nal good to foreign consumers
by assembling a range of intermediate inputs, each of which can be produced at home or
abroad. Production of each of these intermediate inputs, or tasks, requires mastery of its
technological blueprint￿ the "how to"￿ as well as some conventional factor inputs. The costs of
technological transfer come in form of communication costs: in the process of communicating
the knowledge behind each task from multinational parent to a¢ liate, errors can occur which
make a¢ liate production less e¢ cient than parent production.10
Inputs vary in their technological complexity. More complex tasks involve higher costs
of transferring the technological information needed for o⁄shore (a¢ liate) production. It is
di¢ cult, for example, to transfer the knowledge about R&D on product design abroad. This
may be due to non-codi￿ability of the technological know-how or fear of imitation in the
9To ￿x ideas, consider the simplest Ricardian model of trade. There are cross-country e¢ ciency di⁄erences
in production technologies, and a country tends to export ￿nal goods where it has an e¢ ciency advantage
compared to other countries. Importing a good allows to use foreign production technologies, so in some
sense there is di⁄usion of technology. However, the production possibility frontier of a country does not
shift, and it is impossible to ask whether importing a particular good has raised the importer￿ s ability to
produce similar goods at home with the same e¢ ciency that is achieved by the exporter. As it turns out,
this type of question is central to how international trade might a⁄ect international technology di⁄usion.
10The analysis builds on ideas presented in Arrow (1969). Koskinen et al (2002) discusses the reasons
why face-to-face communication has distinct advantages over all other forms of communicating technological
knowledge. Teece (1977) presents direct evidence that the size of technology transfer costs in multinational
enterprises are substantial.
6absence of perfect property rights protection. Other tasks are easier to transfer, perhaps
because the codi￿ability is higher or the degree of standardization is higher.
While the tasks can be completed by the multinational a¢ liate, alternatively the tasks can
also be performed by the multinational parent in the home country, after which the assem-
bled intermediate good is exported to the a¢ liate subject to shipping costs. Multinational
￿rms thus face a trade-o⁄ between the costs of communicating disembodied technological
information from parent to a¢ liate and the shipping cost for the intermediate that embodies
the technological information.
This setting has a number of attractive features. First, technological knowledge has
a well-de￿ned meaning, and our notion of technology transfer costs is in line with Hayek
(1945), Polanyi (1958), and others.11 Second, because ￿rms can either sell through trade or
through produce in the host economy, it becomes possible to ask which of these activities
is associated with greater technology transfer. Moreover, even though FDI and exports are
substitutes at the task level, the model implies, in line with the evidence, complementarity
of trade and FDI at a more aggregated level (Blonigen 2001).
As will be shown below, the trade-o⁄ between trade and transfer costs yields an endoge-
nously determined level of technological knowledge that di⁄uses internationally. For a given
foreign market, inputs with high technology transfer costs will be produced at home and
exported, while inputs with low transfer costs will be produced abroad. Conversely, across
foreign markets, as trade costs rise in geographic distance, technology transfer costs rise too,
11Hayek (1945) and Polanyi (1958) discuss that codi￿ability of information (versus tacitness) a⁄ect its
transfer cost; see also Hippel (1994). Feldman and Lichtenberg (1998) show empirically that codi￿ability is
associated with better transferability of information.
7and the model predicts that the inputs imported by the a¢ liate from its parent are becoming
increasingly technologically complex.
Moreover, as trade costs are rising between the multinational ￿rm￿ s home and its a¢ liates￿
host countries, so will technology transfer costs, because the two are equated on the margin.
As costs are increasing, ￿rms will be forced to set higher prices in order to break even,
and that reduces their sales. Thus, the result is the so-called gravity pattern for a¢ liate
sales￿ FDI falling in geographic distance￿that ￿nds strong empirical support in the data.
The following section provides more details on this framework.
The model Consider a world composed of K + 1 countries indexed by k = f0;1;:::;Kg.
Each country is endowed with a quantity of labor, the only factor, and Nik entrepreneurs
each endowed with the knowledge of how to produce a variety of good i. In each country, the
representative consumer has identical, homothetic preferences over I di⁄erentiated goods,




















where ￿i is the set of varieties available in industry i, qi(!) is the quantity of output of
variety ! consumed, ￿i > 1 is the elasticity of demand in industry i, and Y is the quantity
consumed of the homogenous good. Each country produces good Y using a single unit of
labor and so wages are the same in every country. Henceforth the wage is normalized to
unity. Assuming that ￿rms are too small to a⁄ect industry level demands, the preferences
(1) imply the following iso-elastic demand for variety ! in country k:
8qk(!) = Bik(pk(!))
￿￿i; (2)
where Bik is the endogenous markup-adjusted demand level in country k and industry i, and
pk(!) is the price of the variety ! in country k.
In industry i each variety can be costlessly assembled from a continuum of ￿rm-speci￿c












where m(z) is the quantity of ￿rm-speci￿c intermediate of complexity used, ￿i(z) is the
cost share of z for a ￿rm producing a good in industry i. As shown below, z is an index of
the technological complexity of an input. Industries that use predominantly high-z inputs
have high cost shares ￿i(z) for such inputs, and consequently I refer to such industries as
technologically complex industries. In the interest of simplicity, a functional form is chosen
for ￿i(z) that summarizes an industry￿ s technological complexity using a single parameter:
￿i(z) = ￿i exp(￿￿iz). (4)
This parameterization implies that the average technological complexity of intermediate
inputs in industry i is 1=￿i, so I refer to industries with low ￿i as technologically complex.
Further, in the limit as ￿i ! 1 the average technological complexity goes to zero.
To produce one unit of an intermediate input z, a number of tasks, given by z, must be
successfully completed. In the application of each task, problems arise that will, if unsolved,
9result in the destruction of that unit. A plant￿ s management must communicate the problem
to the ￿rm￿ s headquarters which must in turn communicate to the plant the solution to the
problem. If communication is successful for each task, then one unit of the input is produced
for each unit of labor employed. If the solution to any problem fails to be communicated,
then the input that is produced is useless.
A ￿rm that has chosen to assemble its product in country k must supply the local
plant with intermediate inputs that are either produced in the home country or in the host
country k. In making this decision, the ￿rm must weigh two types of costs of doing business
internationally: shipping costs and technology transfer costs. First, suppose that an input
z is produced in the home country. It is assumed that when the plant and the headquarters
are located in the same country communication is perfect and no inputs are wasted by the
inability to successfully complete a task so that one unit of labor produces one unit of output.
In shipping this intermediate input to its a¢ liate, the parent ￿rm incurs so-called iceberg-
type trade costs, that is, ￿ik > 1 units have to be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at
the destination.
If the ￿rm produces an intermediate input z in an a¢ liate located in country k then it
avoids shipping costs, but imperfect communication between plant and headquarters leads
to a loss of productivity. As stressed by Arrow (1969), there can be large e¢ ciency losses
when communication between teachers (here the multinationals￿parents) and students (here
the multinationals￿a¢ liates) fails. In particular, when the ￿rm￿ s headquarters and the plant
are in di⁄erent countries, the probability of successful communication between headquarters
and a¢ liate is e ￿ 2 (0;1). Assuming that the success rate of communication is independent
10across tasks, the probability of successful communication is (e ￿)z and so the expected number
of labor units needed to produce a unit of intermediate input z is equal to the inverse of
(e ￿)z:
1=(e ￿)
z = exp(￿z lne ￿)
= exp(￿z); (5)
where the parameter ￿ ￿ ￿lne ￿ > 0 is inversely related to communicability and so measures
the ine¢ ciency costs of international technology transfer. Hence, a relatively high value of
z is associated with relatively low productivity when production of this intermediate input
takes place in the a¢ liate plant located o⁄shore.
It is possible now to summarize the sense in which high-z inputs are technologically
complex in our model. Inputs with high values of z require the successful completion of a
relatively high number of tasks. Because there is some di¢ culty in communicating techno-
logical information for each one of these tasks, a relatively high number of tasks translates
into a relatively high level of technological complexity.
The following shows how the physical cost of shipping costs and the e¢ ciency costs of
technology transfer interact to determine a geography of costs across a¢ liates within the
multinational ￿rm.
Technical Complexity and the Geography of A¢ liate Costs Consider a ￿rm with its
headquarters in country 0 that has opened an assembly plant in country k and is minimizing
11the cost of supplying intermediate inputs to that a¢ liate. The marginal cost of supplying





￿ik if imported from parent
exp(￿z) if produced by a¢ liate
: (6)
There exists a cuto⁄intermediate input b zik such that all inputs with z < b zik will be produced
by the a¢ liate and all intermediates z > b zik will be imported by the a¢ liate from the





One empirical implication following directly from (7) concerns the technological complexity of
intra-￿rm trade: as trade costs between the multinational parent and its a¢ liates increase,
the average technological complexity of the a¢ liates￿imports from their parent increases
(db zik=d￿ik > 0).
It is now shown that the trade-o⁄ between trade costs and technology transfer costs
determines the multinational ￿rms￿production costs for di⁄erent locations. Using (3), it can







Substituting (6) into (8), using (7), and integrating by parts, the marginal cost of producing












Consider the e⁄ect on Cik of an increase in ￿ik, the size of trade costs between parent
















According to equation (10), for any industry in which technology features non-zero com-
plexity (i.e. 1=￿i > 0) an increase in the size of trade cost, ￿ik, between a¢ liate and parent
results in an increase in the marginal cost of the a¢ liate. Further, the size of this increase
is strictly increasing in the technical complexity of the industry 1=￿i. Only in the limiting
case of 1=￿i ! 0 does an increase in trade cost not result in higher a¢ liate marginal costs.
The following lemma summarizes the result.
Lemma 1 An a¢ liate￿ s marginal cost is increasing in the size of trade cost between parent





, is higher in technologically complex industries (low ￿i).
Equation (10) has two important empirical implications.
Technological Complexity and the Power of Gravity Because a¢ liates rely on im-
ported intermediate inputs, their marginal costs of production are rising in trade costs. The
13rate at which marginal costs rise depend on the ￿rm￿ s technological complexity: ￿rms that
require more technologically complex intermediate inputs are more exposed to changes in
trade costs because they rely more heavily on inputs that are hard to o⁄shore.
Consider the size of an a¢ liate￿ s revenues generated on sales to customers in its host
country market k. The iso-elastic demand (2) imply that the optimal price charged by the
a¢ liate pik = ￿iCik=(￿i￿1). Using (2) and substituting for the price, the a¢ liate￿ s revenues
are















= ￿(￿i ￿ 1)"
Cik
￿ik .
This equation combined with Lemma 1 has the following implication.
Proposition 1 Holding ￿xed the demand level, Bik, the value of a¢ liate revenues generated
on sales to local customers, Rik, is decreasing in trade cost ￿ik, and the rate of this decrease
is highest in technologically complex industries (low ￿i).
This proposition states that there will be a gravity relationship of multinational sales
with trade costs that stems from the interaction between trade costs and technical complex-
ity. When technology is perfectly transferable internationally, as in the limiting case when
1=￿i ! 0, a¢ liate sales display no gravity e⁄ect. As technology becomes more complex
(1=￿i increases), the power of gravity becomes increasingly pronounced.
14The second important empirical implication of equation (10) concerns the aggregate
volume intra-￿rm imports in total a¢ liate costs as a function of technological complexity
and the size of trade costs. By Shepard￿ s Lemma, equation (10) describes the cost share of
intermediates imported by an a¢ liate from its parent ￿rm. Letting IMik be the aggregate
value of the imports of an a¢ liate in country k and industry i from its parent ￿rm and











From this expression the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 2 The share of intermediate inputs imported from the parent ￿rm in total costs
(IMik=TCik) is strictly decreasing in transport costs (￿ik) between a¢ liate and parent, and
the rate of decline is slower in technologically complex (low ￿i) industries.
For a given increase in transport costs, the cost share of intermediates imported from
the parent ￿rm in total a¢ liate cost is decreasing more slowly in technologically complex
industries because these industries are intensive in intermediates whose production is harder
to move o⁄shore. In the limit as 1=￿i ! 0 the import share IMik=TCik goes to zero: all
tasks can be costlessly o⁄shored and the a¢ liate is not exposed to the cost of importing
intermediates from its parent. Controlling for other determinants of multinational activity,
Keller and Yeaple (2009a) present evidence in support of both of these propositions: the
gravity for multinational sales is stronger for relatively complex goods, and the share of
a¢ liate imports tends to be high for complex goods because the technology for those is
15di¢ cult to transfer.
The model also correctly predicts that trade becomes on average more technologically
complex as trade costs between exporting and importing country rise. The following Figure
1 shows the relationship for U.S. exports. Here, complexity, proxied by the average R&D
intensity of the exports, is on the vertical axis, while trade costs between the U.S. and other
countries are depicted.
There is a clear positive relationship, while trade cost di⁄erences accounting for almost
half of the di⁄erences in the technological complexity of exports. Keller and Yeaple (2009a)
show that the simple correlation is robust to controlling for other factors, including di⁄erences
in the value-to-weigth ratios of the goods that are exported.
The model can be easily closed to derive comparative static results. For example, a
16decline in the costs of technology transfer (￿ #) is associated with lower a¢ liate costs and
more foreign direct investment activity. These predictions describing the trade, FDI, and
international technology transfer decisions of multinational ￿rms provide a useful background
for this chapter. As noted above, each ￿rm thus far internalizes the costs and bene￿ts from
the technology transfer. At the same time, it is straightforward to extend the model so that
the local production activities of the a¢ liate generate learning spillovers for host country
￿rms. This would some new microfoundations for FDI technology spillovers. Similarly, the
model can be extended to allow for multinational parent exports to una¢ liated host country
￿rms. From the importer￿ s point of view, intermediate goods from a foreign multinational
parent embodying its technological knowledge are a plausible source for technology spillovers.
The model can also explain why the potential for technology spillovers are higher when
interacting with a foreign multinational and exporter compared to with the average domestic
￿rm. As shown by Keller and Yeaple (2009a), when the model is extended so that ￿rms are
heterogeneous in productivity and there are ￿xed costs of foreign market entry, there will a
new extensive margin prediction: ￿rms that are internationally active are more productive
than purely domestic ￿rms. In addition, there is a pecking order of foreign activity, with the
most productive ￿rms being active in most foreign markets, while the least productive inter-
nationally active ￿rm operates in only one foreign market. Given their higher productivity,
the potential for technological learning from foreign ￿rms is thus higher than for learning
from the average domestic ￿rm.
The previous section has laid out formally the major ideas on how trade and FDI are
related to international technology di⁄usion. The extent to which trade and FDI are system-
17atic causes of international technology spillovers is a complex question that requires careful
empirical analysis, and the evidence on it will be discussed below. The next section looks at
the data, a critical element of any empirical analysis.
3 Data and what they capture
3.1 Measures of Technology
Technology is an intangible that is di¢ cult to measure directly. Three widely-used indirect
approaches are to measure (i) inputs (R&D), or (2) outputs (patents), or (3) the impact
of technology (higher productivity). Regarding the ￿rst, internationally comparable data
on R&D expenditures are published by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) since about 1965. According to the OECD￿ s de￿nition (OECD 2002),
only about two dozen relatively rich countries report substantial amounts of R&D, because
the de￿nition captures primarily resources spent towards innovation, and not those spent
on imitation and technology adoption. Technology investments of middle-income and poor
countries can therefore typically not be analyzed using R&D data. 12
A drawback of R&D as a measure of technology is that it ignores the stochastic nature
of the process of innovation. The current ￿ ow of R&D expenditures is a noisy measure of
technology improvements in that period. Many authors construct R&D stocks from the
12R&D data becomes more widely available as countries￿incomes are rising. There is also increasingly
information on poorer countries because surveys encompass the R&D conducted by a¢ liates of multinational
companies located abroad; see e.g. NSF (2004) for R&D expenditures of U.S. ￿rms in China. Also note
that the main OECD R&D statistics are on a geographic, not ownership, basis, so that R&D conducted in
foreign-owned a¢ liates is counted as host country R&D.
18￿ ows using the perpetual inventory method. Beyond year-to-year noise, the return to R&D
expenditures may vary substantially. One important aspect of this is that the return to
publicly funded R&D is lower than the return to privately funded R&D (Lichtenberg 1993),
and many studies focus on business research and development spending.
Turning to the second type of data on technology, a patent gives its holder a temporary
legal monopoly to use an innovation in a speci￿c market at the price of public disclosure of
technical information in the patent description. An innovation must be su¢ ciently important
to be worthy a patent, which is judged by a trained o¢ cial (called patent examiner). Relative
to R&D, patents have the advantage that data has been collected for longer time (more than
150 years for some countries), and also poorer countries have a substantial number of patents
(see WIPO 2009).
There are some issues with using patent data as well. First, a small number of patents
accounts for most of the value of all patents. This means that simple patent counts may
not measure well technology output. Recent work has addressed this issue in part by using
citation-weighted patent data (see Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg 2002). Second, the decision to
patent is an act of choice on the part of the ￿rm, and a large set of innovations is not ever
patented. And third, the part of technology that is non-codi￿able will necessarily be missed
by patents.13
The third measure of technology discussed here is total factor productivity (TFP). The
idea, well-known since the 1950s, is that if one subtracts from output the contribution of
inputs such as labor and capital, the remainder is due to the factor ￿technology￿ . A simple
13See also Griliches (1990) who discusses the pros and cons of patent data.
19example of TFP is the term A in the following Cobb-Douglas production function with factor
capital and labor,
Y = A ￿ K
￿L
1￿￿ () A = TFP =
Y
K￿L1￿￿;
where 0 < ￿ < 1: Other TFP measures are more general and have certain desirable prop-
erties that are important for comparability (e.g. the superlative index proposed by Caves,
Christensen, and Diewert 91982).
In contrast to R&D and patents, TFP is a derived measure of technology, as it is computed
from data on inputs and output. This introduces measurement error and perhaps biases,
because the appropriate data on inputs and outputs is rarely available. Katayama, Lu, and
Tybout (2003) emphasize that the use of (1) real sales revenues, (2) depreciated capital
spending, and (3) real input expenditures; instead of (unavailable) data on the physical
quantities (1) of output, (2) of capital, and (3) of intermediate inputs, as is frequently done,
will often confound higher productivity with higher mark-ups. Other factors might thus
contaminate the use of TFP as a measure of technological e¢ ciency, which ultimately goes
back to the concern that TFP is constructed as a residual, and may potentially capture
spurious in￿ uences.
Because of these di¢ culties in computing TFP, researchers have pursued a number of
strategies. One is to consider changes in TFP as opposed to TFP levels. This will help in
identifying technological change if spurious factors do not change over time, or more generally,
if they change less than technology. For example, in Katayama, Lu, and Tybout￿ s (2003) case
from above, if a ￿rm faces higher adjustment costs to changing its mark-up, this will reduce
20the mark-up variability in equilibrium. A second strategy has been to employ TFP measures
together with data on R&D (e.g., Griliches 1984). By establishing a relationship between
TFP changes and its presumed major cause, R&D spending, the likelihood of measuring
changes in technology appropriately is substantially enhanced.
There is also now survey evidence on technology and innovation activities. Some of it is
even harmonized across countries; for example, the most recent wave of the European Com-
munity Innovation Survey (CIS-4) includes 101 indicators on a variety of aspects, including
product and process innovation, R&D, e⁄ects of innovation, and patents. Crespi, Criscuolo,
Haskel, and Slaughter (2008) and MacGarvie (2006) have employed this data. Several coun-
tries also collect more specialized information related to innovation and training parallel to
their census data collection in additional programs. The ENESTyC (Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog￿a y Capacitaci￿n) of Mexico, for example, includes information
of whether plants have undergone ISO 9000 certi￿cation, which is a standard for quality
management systems; see, e.g., Iacovone and Keller (2009). In some cases, authors have also
conducted their own interviews to obtain survey evidence on ￿rms￿use of technology (Bloom
and van Reenen 2007).
We now turn to measures of international technology spillovers.
3.2 Measurement of International Technology Spillovers
Naturally, data on spillovers does not exist. Measures that are related to it do exist, but
typically they capture spillovers only partially, because the measures do not account for
costs of acquisition (learning). For instance, if one patent application cites an earlier patent,
21this generally indicates that the applicant has bene￿ted from the earlier patent, and it
strongly suggests that a knowledge ￿ ow has taken place. At the same time, there is often
little information on how large these bene￿ts are net of the learning costs that the patent
applicant had to incur.
Among the di⁄erent methods that try to measure international spillovers, the largest
set of papers employs international R&D spillover regressions. In one set of papers, if
R&D of ￿rm j is positively correlated with TFP of ￿rm i, all else equal, this is consistent
with international technology spillovers from ￿rm j to ￿rm i (Keller 2002a). A variant of
this approach replaces TFP by the number of patents (Branstetter 2001), and Peri (2002)
presents a hybrid approach by relating patents in region i to patents in other regions, where
the latter is instrumented by R&D expenditures.
Empirical analysis using R&D spillover regressions has been extended to include partic-
ular channels for the spillovers. Coe and Helpman (1995) analyze the relationship between
productivity and foreign R&D conditional on imports from that foreign country, while other
authors have considered FDI as well.14 Another strand in the literature relates a possible
channel for technology spillovers directly to productivity. Aitken and Harrison (1999), e.g.,
study the correlation of domestic ￿rm productivity and inward foreign direct investment in
so-called FDI spillover regressions.
There are two major questions that any empirical analysis needs to address. Consider
an analysis at the ￿rm level. First, if the technological capabilities of a ￿rm have improved,
can one establish that a technology transfer from another ￿rm abroad was causal for this
14The idea of using trade or other weights in such R&D regressions goes at least back to Griliches (1979).
22improvement? Causality is a key point in much of empirical analysis. In this particular
setting, often the technological capability of the receiving ￿rm is only imperfectly observed
(e.g., its productivity), and there is rarely data on technology transfer. Establishing causality
is particularly di¢ cult under these circumstances. The second key question is which part of
the transfer can be considered a technology spillover. This is crucial for assessing the case
for economic policy intervention.
I will return to these issues in various contexts when discussing the evidence on technology
spillovers related to trade and FDI. Before doing so, the next chapter discusses technology
spillovers shaped by geography.
4 An Empirical Benchmark: Spillovers Shaped by Ge-
ography
Global technology spillovers favor income convergence, while local spillovers tend to lead to
divergence, no matter through which channel technology di⁄uses. This is why a major strand
of the literature has examined international technology di⁄usion in its geographic dimension
(Ja⁄e, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993, Irwin and Klenow 1994, Eaton and Kortum 1999,
Branstetter 2001, Keller 2002a, and Bottazzi and Peri 2003). An advantage of this is that
geography is arguably an exogenous determinant in this process.
The question has been studied in a number of ways. One question is whether technology
di⁄usion within countries is stronger than across countries. The evidence generally supports
this hypothesis, although there are exceptions. In particular, Ja⁄e, Trajtenberg, and Hender-
23son (1993) compare the geographic location of patent citations with that of the cited patents
in the United States. They ￿nd that U.S. patents are signi￿cantly more often cited by other
U.S. patents than they are cited by foreign patents. Thompson and Fox Kean (2005) have
shown that the three-digit patent classi￿cation scheme employed by Ja⁄e, Trajtenberg, and
Henderson (1993) may be too imprecise to conduct a powerful treatment-and-control analy-
sis. Even when the matching is based on a more disaggregated classi￿cation, it is a good
idea to examine whether the patents that belong to a given patent class are technologically
su¢ ciently homogeneous.
Branstetter (2001) uses R&D and patenting data on U.S. and Japanese ￿rms to compute
weighted R&D spillover stocks. He con￿rms that patent citations are geographically localized
in the sense that within-country spillovers are much stronger than between-country spillovers.
More evidence for stronger di⁄usion within- than across countries is presented by Eaton and
Kortum￿ s (1999) study. These authors estimate that for the G-5 countries (France, Germany,
Japan, the UK, and the US), the rate of domestic technology di⁄usion is much higher than
the typical rate of international technology di⁄usion between these countries.15
In contrast, Irwin and Klenow (1994) do not ￿nd stronger within country spillover com-
pared to across country spillovers. Irwin and Klenow estimate that for eight vintages of
semiconductors introduced between 1974 and 1992, the spillovers from one U.S. ￿rm to an-
other U.S. ￿rm are not signi￿cantly stronger than those between an U.S. ￿rm and a foreign
￿rm. The di⁄erent results might be obtained because Irwin and Klenow￿ s spillovers, which
15Eaton and Kortum estimate a ratio of about 200 for domestic versus the average international technology
di⁄usion rates, which may be on the high side.
24are identi￿ed from the e⁄ects of cumulative production on market shares, are di⁄erent from
knowledge spillovers as measured in the other studies. It could also have to do with the
particulars of the semiconductor industry at the time. Most of the relatively small number
of ￿rms were located in the U.S. and in Japan, which means that the scope for identifying
the within versus between country di⁄erence is limited.
The analysis has therefore been extended beyond the national versus international distinc-
tion by estimating spillovers conditional on geographic distance and the countries￿locations
relative to each other (Keller 2002a, 2001). Keller (2002a) relates industry-level productiv-











Here, Dcj is the geographic distance between countries c and j and X is a vector of control
variables. If ￿ is estimated to be greater than zero, variation in productivity is best accounted
for by giving a lower weight to R&D conducted in countries that are located relatively far
away, whereas if ￿ = 0, geographic distance and relative location do not matter. Keller
(2002a) ￿nds that ￿ is positive, and moreover, the decay of technology di⁄usion implied by the
estimate is substantial: with every additional 1,200 kilometers distance there is a 50% drop
of technology di⁄usion. Applying this estimate to Australia, for example, with its remote
geographic location relative to the G-5 countries, would suggest that Australia bene￿ts
extremely little from technology created in the G-5 countries. Along the same lines, Bottazzi
25and Peri (2003) ￿nd a strong geographic decay in their analysis of technology di⁄usion
between European regions. These studies suggest that technology is highly geographically
localized in particular countries and regions.
A related question is whether the degree of localization has fallen in recent years. This
may be expected as a consequence of transport cost improvements, information and commu-
nication technology innovations, increased multinational activity, as well as other changes.
Keller (2002a) examines this by estimating di⁄erent decay parameters (￿ above) for the late
1970s and the early 1990s. The estimates indicate that ￿ has shrunk substantially over time
in absolute value, suggesting that the degree of localization has become smaller. The ￿gure
illustrates the results.
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According to these estimates, for the period of the 1970s and early 1980s, the degree of
localization of technology di⁄usion was such that at a distance of 1,000 kilometers away from
26the technology sender, on average only about 20% of the technological knowledge was still
available (see the dashed line). At 2,000 kilometers, this fraction had fallen to about 5%,
and once the distance between technology sender and recipient had reached 4,000 kilometers,
there was virtually no technological knowledge left. In contrast, for a later period (1986-
95), the fraction of technological knowledge available according to these estimates is about
70% at 1,000 kilometers, 50% at 2,000 kilometers, and still about 25% at 4,000 kilometers
(see the solid line). This provides strong evidence that the information and communication
technology innovations mentioned above led to more international di⁄usion of technology
over time.
One concern is that the estimated geography e⁄ect may be spurious, perhaps due to
unobserved heterogeneity across locations. This issue is addressed in a number of studies,
and while the proposed solutions are imperfect, overall the results con￿rm that geography in
fact is an important determinant of technology di⁄usion. The key question is exactly what
the geography e⁄ect captures: does this pick up trade costs, for instance? It is well-known
that trade volumes are strongly declining with distance (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995), and
trade could be is associated with technology transfer (see section 6 below). Moreover, FDI
also more prevalent in the geographic vicinity relative to far away destinations (Brainard
1997). To date research has not fully accounted for the geography e⁄ect in international
technology di⁄usion.
The following section discusses the role of FDI for international technology di⁄usion.
275 Foreign Direct Investment as a Channel for Technol-
ogy Spillvovers
In the model described in section 2, multinational a¢ liates complete the tasks not imported
from their multinational parent through local production in the host country. Local workers
are hired for this purposes. If workers learn about the multinational￿ s technology, either by
on-the-job activity or formal training, then once they quit they may be able to transmit a
positive learning e⁄ect to a domestic ￿rm, or they may start their own new ￿rm. Under the
realistic assumption that job contract provisions do not fully compensate for these learning
e⁄ects, the multinational a¢ liate generates a positive technology spillover to a domestic ￿rm
(FDI spillovers through worker turnover).16
Moreover, the multinational a¢ liate might generate technological learning spillovers to
other ￿rms in the industry through its business operations. The literature refers to these
within-industry e⁄ects as horizontal FDI spillovers. For example, the cold chain operations
that Walmex, Wal-Mart￿ s a¢ liate in Mexico, introduced in the1990s were soon copied by all
of Walmex retailing competitors (Iacovone, Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2009).17 Because
the introduction of a cold chain requires major investments, the size of the externality must
be less than the value of the cold chain. At the same time, the physical proximity of the
multinational a¢ liate will typically reduce the costs of learning about and adopting such
technologies relative to what it would have otherwise been.
16Fosfuri, Motta, and Ronde (2001) provide a model.
17Alfaro and Rodriguez (2004) provide additional examples.
28Instead of producing everything in-house, as in the model of section 2, the multinational
￿rm in the model above may also outsource certain intermediate inputs. If the a¢ liate buys
inputs from local suppliers, there may be so-called vertical backward technology spillovers.
They arise when the multinational a¢ liate provides technology to its supplier at a price
that is below its market value. In addition, there could be additional vertical technology
spillovers if the multinational￿ s technology di⁄uses from its own to other suppliers. In the
case of vertical forward e⁄ects, the technology would di⁄use from the multinational a¢ liate
to downstream ￿rms.
FDI spillovers matter not only as a possible channel of international technology di⁄usion,
but also because governments all over the world spend large amounts of resources to attract
subsidiaries of multinationals to their jurisdiction. For instance, in 1994 the U.S. state of
Alabama spent $ 230 million, or $ 150,000 per newly created job, to attract a new plant of
Mercedes-Benz.18 Could subsidies of this magnitude possibly be satis￿ed? To answer this
question one requires precise estimates of the size of the positive technological externalities
associated with foreign direct investment.
Researchers also need to distinguish technological externalities from pecuniary external-
ities. The latter arise for example if the arrival of a multinational a¢ liate induces local
￿rms to produce a greater variety of inputs, which may bene￿t local downstream producers
(Rodriguez-Clare 1996).19 The case is distinct, because even though there may be productiv-
ity gains for domestic ￿rms, there is no transfer of technology. Subsidies to attract a foreign
18This case is mentioned in Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007).
19This is an example of backward linkages, a concept that goes back to Hirschman (1958). Alfaro and
Rodriguez-Clare (2004) provide some discussion.
29multinational can be domestic welfare-enhancing, but it may be even better for the country
to simply remove domestic policy barriers that prevent domestic entry in the downstream
market.
The entry of a¢ liates of multinational ￿rms may also impact domestic ￿rm productivity
(as well as pro￿ts) in other ways that do not constitute evidence for technology spillovers.
First, if the a¢ liate sells a new quality-upgraded input to domestic ￿nal goods producers, it
will under realistic assumptions not be able to receive a price that compensates to 100% for
the quality improvement. Even though measured productivity of local ￿rms goes up, this is a
measurement problem, not a technology spillover (see Griliches 1995). Second, multinational
entry often leads to a higher degree of competition. This increase in competition may induce
￿rms to reduce ine¢ ciencies, and thus increase productivity, but no technology di⁄usion is
involved. The increase in competition through FDI may also reduce the market share of
domestic ￿rms, which could reduce productivity if there are scale economies.
The size of positive technological externalities associated with FDI is thus di¢ cult to
obtain. In addition, the analysis relies typically only on proxies for technology variables￿
the exact channel is rarely identi￿ed. As a consequence, apparent technology spillovers
may be spurious. There is a premium, then, for including control variables that may address
omitted variables bias. Moreover, plausible exogeneous variation in FDI is needed to establish
causality, and this may require instrumental variable analysis.
I now turn to the evidence for technological externalities from inward FDI.
305.1 Evidence on Inward FDI Spillovers
What is the evidence on FDI spillovers? Citing primarily panel micro-econometric results,
observers have recently tended to conclude that there is no evidence for substantial FDI
spillovers (G￿rg and Greenaway 2004, Hanson 2001, Rodrik 1999). Over the last few years,
there has been a ￿ urry of studies, and several authors have argued ￿nding evidence for FDI
spillovers. We will discuss these results below.
Moreover, there has always been relevant case study evidence on FDI spillovers, which
tends to be somewhat overlooked in the economics literature. A case study of Intel￿ s FDI into
Costa Rica, for example, provides interesting information on how widespread the changes
can be that FDI by a major high-technology company can trigger in a relatively small
country (Larrain, Lopez-Calva, and Rodriguez-ClarØ 2000). The evidence on the impact
of Wal-Mart￿ s entry into the Mexican market is also consistent with technological learning
externalities accruing to domestically-owned ￿rms (Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2008). At
the same time, not all the case study evidence points to technology spillovers associated
with FDI. For example, a study on Latin America reports that multinational ￿rms often do
not know the technologies employed by their suppliers (Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare 2004).
Under these circumstances the potential for substantial backward FDI spillovers will be low.
Some authors have provided econometric evidence on whether multinational a¢ liates
raise the rate of international technology transfer as measured by patent citations (Glober-
mann, Kokko, and Sjoh￿lm 2000, Branstetter 2001, and Singh 2003). There are two possi-
bilities. First, a¢ liates could either disseminate technology to domestic ￿rms of their host
31country (inward FDI technology spillovers), or they might pick up new technologies from
the ￿rms in the host country (outward FDI technology spillovers; see section 5.2). These
studies tend to ￿nd that inward technology spillovers are smaller than outward spillovers.
This result, however, might be indicative of a number of problems.
The ￿rst is ￿rm heterogeneity: multinational a¢ liates are larger and more technologically
intensive than the average ￿rm in the host country, and this might be the reason why they
are good at sourcing technology. This interpretation seems to be con￿rmed by Singh￿ s (2003)
￿nding that patent citations between two multinational a¢ liates is stronger than either from
a¢ liate to a domestic ￿rm or the reverse. The second issue is endogeneity. It could be that
one ￿nds multinational a¢ liates to be sourcing more technology than they provide because
the multinational parent set up the subsidiary with the explicit goal of technology sourcing,
while the average host country ￿rm, in contrast, has not made a comparable location decision.
This suggests that the estimates are not fully comparable, and future research is needed to
settle this issue.
In addition, the value of a patent is di¢ cult to estimate.20 An important issue in the
patent citation studies is therefore the economic signi￿cance of the technology di⁄usion that
has been measured in this way. In order to avoid this problem, a large literature has tried to
estimate directly the extent to which FDI leads to productivity increases for domestic ￿rms.
Xu (2000) uses the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis￿comparable data on U.S. outward
FDI into 40 countries over almost 30 years (between 1966 and 1994). He ￿nds generally a
positive relation between FDI and domestic productivity growth, which is stronger in the
20See however Pakes (1986).
32richer than in the poorer countries.
There may be, however, unobserved heterogeneity across ￿rms and sectors that a⁄ects
the analysis, and for this reason, authors have recently focused on panel data analysis with
micro data (Aitken and Harrison 1999, Girma and Wakelin 2001, Javorcik 2004, Haskel,
Pereira, and Slaughter 2007, Blalock and Gertler 2008, Javorcik and Spatareanu, and Keller
and Yeaple 2009b).
The typical paper estimates a relationship between productivity growth of domestically-
owned ￿rms (￿lnTFP) and a measure of the change in inward FDI (￿FDI) in order to
uncover evidence for FDI spillovers:
￿lnTFPijt = ￿X
0 + ￿￿FDIjt + uijt (13)
Here, X is a vector of control variables, u is a regression error, and i, j, and t are ￿rm (or
plant), industry, and time subscripts, respectively. The parameter ￿ is estimated positive
if productivity growth of ￿rms in industries that have experienced large increases in FDI
exceeds that of ￿rms in industries where FDI has grown little. Under certain conditions,
this approach can uncover technology spillovers to domestic ￿rms. These spillovers can be
in the same industry, as in equation (13), which is referred to as horizontal spillovers. If
the FDI is not in the same industry, but either forward (the multinational sells inputs to
domestic ￿rms) or backward (the multinational buys inputs from domestic ￿rms), it is an
analysis of vertical FDI e⁄ects. The majority of research has been on horizontal spillovers,
to which I turn ￿rst.
33Horizontal FDI Spillovers The recent view that horizontal FDI spillovers are small or do
not exist at all starts with the work by Aitken and Harrison (1999). They estimate a negative
relationship between inward FDI and domestic industry productivity (￿ < 0), and evidence
from Romania and Indonesia has con￿rmed this pattern (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008,
Blalock and Gertler 2008). Because technological learning spillovers cannot be negative,
an important question is where this result comes from. One hypothesis, ￿rst proposed by
Aitken and Harrison (1999), is that whatever positive FDI spillovers there are, they seem to
be small compared to the negative impact of FDI on domestic productivity through increased
competition.
As long as the analysis only estimates the net e⁄ect, of course the magnitude of technology
spillovers through FDI is not determined. Thus, in principle the ￿ndings are consistent
with FDI spillovers justifying substantial government subsidies. However, a side e⁄ect of
attracting FDI according to this argument would be lower domestic productivity through
the competition e⁄ect.21 At the same time, there is a lot of recent evidence, starting with
Pavcnik (2002), that increased competition through trade or FDI liberalization increases,
not decreases domestic ￿rm productivity. The ￿nding of lower ￿rm productivity due to
more competition is thus puzzling. If the negative coe¢ cient on FDI in equation (13) is not
the result of competition e⁄ects, then what else may be behind it?
First of all, the decision of FDI could be endogenous to the productivity of domestic ￿rms.
FDI as the mode of market entry may be primarily chosen for industries in which domestic
21The theoretical prediction for the impact of more competition on innovation is ambiguous (Aghion et
al. 2005).
34￿rms are relatively unproductive, and if this is correlated with the ability to bene￿t from
technology spillovers, the FDI coe¢ cient will be biased downwards. The within-industry
results of Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), and Blalock and
Gertler (2008) include industry and time ￿xed e⁄ects to contain such e⁄ects. Endogeneity
may persist however even after the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects. An instrumental variable
strategy may be the only way to arrive at unbiased estimates.
Second, studies often face serious data limitations, which requires to employ relatively
crude measures. Typically, FDI in equation (13) is the employment or output share of
foreign-owned a¢ liates in an industry. Because this does not capture di⁄erences in the
technological capabilities ￿ owing into the country by inward FDI across industries and over
time, the estimate of ￿ is likely biased towards zero because of measurement error.
Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) study FDI into the United Kingdom to provide
evidence on technology spillovers from horizontal FDI. In contrast to earlier work, they
estimate positive FDI spillover coe¢ cients. Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) relate
productivity growth of UK-owned plants to changes in FDI employment shares for 22 man-
ufacturing industries. It is the industry-year variation that identi￿es the FDI coe¢ cient. To
do this properly, it is important to distinguish the e⁄ects of FDI from other industry-year
speci￿c shocks, such as energy price shocks or new information technology, which also have
an industry-speci￿c component. For this, the industry by year ￿xed e⁄ects employed by
Blalock and Gertler (2008) will be more e⁄ective than the additive industry and year dum-
mies in Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007). Moreover, if there are many plants that are
a⁄ected by the same FDI in￿ ow in a given industry-year, this will create dependence among
35the observations, which is equivalent to reducing the sample size. Because the estimated
standard errors depend on sample size, this can a⁄ect inferences. In Haskel, Pereira, and
Slaughter￿ s study there are more than 3,000 plants but only 22 industries per year. With
t-statistics of around 3 without adjustment for dependence in the sample (Haskel, Pereira,
and Slaughter 2007, Table 3), these FDI estimates are not necessarily signi￿cant once the
dependence across observations is accounted for.22
Keller and Yeaple (2009b) consider technology spillovers from inward FDI accruing to
U.S. ￿rms during the period of 1987 to 1996. In contrast to earlier work, these authors ￿nd
robust and statistically signi￿cant evidence for technology spillovers resulting from horizontal
FDI, even after addressing important issues such as sample dependence and endogeneity.
Moreover, Keller and Yeaple￿ s (2009b) estimates imply an economically large impact, where
FDI spillovers account for a substantial fraction￿ may be close to 20%￿ of U.S. manufacturing
productivity growth.23
Given these di⁄erences in results, an important question is where Keller and Yeaple￿ s
(2009b) analysis di⁄ers from earlier studies. Some observers have concluded that while there
are no horizontal technology spillovers from FDI in less developed countries, they do seem
to exist in richer countries, such as the United States. However, this can not be the full
story, because there is much variation in FDI spillover estimates even among the set of
22Clustering standard errors (Moulton 1990) reduces here the e⁄ective sample size n from more than
60,000 (plant-by-year) to 440 (industry-by-year). Least-squares standard errors shrink to zero at a rate of p
n (Wooldridge 2009), which would mean that here the dependence-adjusted standard errors may be higher
by a factor of 12. Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) also present IV results to shed light on causality.
For the IV results, FDI is not signi￿cant for half of them (one out of two) even when no adjustment for
sample dependence is made (Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter 2007, Table 3).
23Keller and Yeaple￿ s estimates range from 8% to 19%, the latter being the preferred IV estimate.
36rich countries.24 Apart from that, why might there be no horizontal FDI spillover in less
developed countries? Is the reason that the ￿rms￿capacity to bene￿t from FDI spillovers
in less developed countries is lower? For one, this explanation ignores ￿rm heterogeneity
in the host country. In addition, there is evidence that it is primarily the relatively small,
low-productivity ￿rms that bene￿t from FDI spillovers.25 Thus, a simple technology gap
explanation may not be able to explain the di⁄erent ￿ndings for less developed versus rich
countries.
There is evidence, however, that technology spillovers from horizontal FDI are concen-
trated in high-technology sectors, whereas there are no FDI spillovers in lower-tech sectors
(Keller and Yeaple 2009b). High-tech sectors are where most technology creation takes
place. Moreover, this suggests that FDI can have vastly di⁄erent spillover potential: low-
skilled assembly activities for re-export to the US such as the Mexican maquiladoras should
be expected to have lower spillovers than R&D-intensity foreign activities that are attracted
to an industrial development park in Bangalore. The quality of the FDI data also makes
a big di⁄erence. Keller and Yeaple (2009b) only ￿nd evidence for substantial technology
spillovers from FDI when the diversi￿cation of multinational a¢ liates is accounted for in
their FDI measure.26 When instead using less-well measured FDI data, they do not ￿nd
evidence for technology spillovers from horizontal FDI, similar to earlier studies.
24Comparing Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter￿ s (2007) study for the UK and Keller and Yeaple￿ s (2009b)
analysis for the US, the FDI coe¢ cients di⁄er by a factor of about 10 (0.05 in the former and 0.5 in the
latter).
25At least in a high-income country such as the United States (Keller and Yeaple 2009b).
26These authors can keep track of changes in the composition of a¢ liates￿activities for their top-6 in-
dustries; in contrast, most studies of FDI spillovers treat a given plant or ￿rm as producing in only one
industry.
37Vertical FDI Spillovers There have also been advances recently in estimating technology
spillovers from vertical FDI relations (e.g., Javorcik 2004, Blalock and Gertler 2008). The
focus has been primarily on backward linkages, because multinational a¢ liates may have an
incentive to transfer knowledge to local ￿rms in upstream sectors, as they may bene￿t from
the improved performance of intermediate input suppliers (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008).
However, while multinational a¢ liates may have an incentive to transfer technology to their
suppliers as this enables them to buy high-quality inputs from them, it is not clear that
multinationals would provide the technology free of charge.
More generally, the dilemma is that the more clearly identi￿able the recipient of the
multinational￿ s technology transfer is, the less likely it is that any productivity e⁄ect is
due to technological externalities. To arrive at an estimate of any externalities involved,
the outright contractual payment for the technology transfer has to be subtracted from
the supplier￿ s revenues before computing it￿ s productivity. If in a given year the supplier
gains a net bene￿t from the technology transfer, this might be an artifact of measurement
problems.27 Thus vertical FDI spillovers may pick up a set of issues that do not arise
when studying horizontal FDI, making these sets of estimates incomparable in terms of
technological spillover ￿ndings.
Javorcik (2004) ￿nds that domestic ￿rms in Lithuania in the late 1990s that are upstream
to industries which experienced a relatively strong in￿ ow of FDI have systematically higher
productivity than other domestic ￿rms. Blalock and Gertler (2008) show a similar ￿nding for
27Griliches (1995) argued that such "measurement" spillovers are most prevalent when intermediate goods
are being supplied; here the intermediate good is the technological knowledge.
38Indonesian ￿rms. These ￿ndings are consistent with technology spillovers through vertical
FDI. At the same time, there are some reasons to be cautious. First of all, in the absence
of direct evidence on buyer-seller relations, both studies employ economy-wide input-output
tables to model the interaction of domestic ￿rms with upstream multinational a¢ liates. This
may lead to estimation bias if multinationals sourcing patterns are not the same as those of
domestic ￿rms (see Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare 2004 for evidence).
An interesting additional ￿nding in Javorcik (2004) is that the correlation of productivity
with FDI is strongest if the multinational is only partially, and not fully foreign owned. The
result is con￿rmed in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) for a sample of Romanian ￿rms. This
is consistent with the idea that joint ownership generates more technology transfer, perhaps
because wholly owned a¢ liates employ more sophisticated technology that is out of reach for
the average domestic supplier. If the technology gap between foreign and domestic ￿rms is
the key reason for the di⁄erential e⁄ect for wholly versus partially owned a¢ liates, however,
there should be in general a higher spillover for relatively low- compared to high-productivity
domestic ￿rms. As mentioned above, this is in line with some evidence from studies on
horizontal FDI. At the same time, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) report relatively high
FDI coe¢ cients for the relatively high-productivity ￿rms (Table 4). This suggests that the
strong joint ownership e⁄ects are not related to the ￿rms￿di⁄erential technology gap. Future
research should address this important question.
Blalock and Gertler (2008) correctly emphasize that productivity gains can only be exter-
nalities, and therefore a possible concern for policy intervention, if also domestic ￿rms that
are not the immediate supplier of the multinational a¢ liate experience higher productivity.
39This could be for example domestic suppliers that do not directly interact with multina-
tional a¢ liates, or domestic downstream ￿rms that ￿ free ride￿on the technology transfer
from multinational a¢ liate to the local supplier by also buying inputs from that supplier.
In order to shed light on this, Blalock and Gertler (2008) present additional results on the
relationship between downstream FDI and upstream industry price, output, and pro￿ts. The
results are in line with what one expects in the presence of technology spillovers￿ lower price,
higher output, (marginally) higher pro￿ts. Blalock and Gertler (2008) do not provide IV
estimation results to deal with the endogeneity of FDI location.28
FDI Spillovers from Labor Turnover There is also some recent work on labor mobil-
ity as a speci￿c mechanism for FDI spillovers (Gorg and Strobl 2005, Poole 2009). Poole
(2009) estimates what may be called wage spillovers from a large matched establishment-
employee data set for Brazil. Speci￿cally, she ￿nds that workers in establishments with a
higher proportion of workers with some experience at a multinational ￿rm earn higher wages,
consistent with the idea that there are knowledge transfers from multinational to domestic
￿rms￿workers. Her preferred estimate of the typical wage gain through former multinational
workers is quite small, at 0.1% for the average worker, though this may well be only the lower
bound for various reasons.29
Using data for about 200 Ghanaian ￿rms, Gorg and Strobl (2005) investigate whether
domestic ￿rms which have entrepreneurs with previous training at a foreign-owned a¢ liate
28Also Javorcik (2004) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) do not employ instrumental variable
estimation.
29It would be desirable to have information on the establishment at the time when it hires the former
multinational worker, however, Poole￿ s (2009) otherwise remarkable data set does not provide this.
40have a productivity advantage compared to other ￿rms. The authors ￿nd that when the
prior multinational training took place in a ￿rm belonging to the same industry, there are
productivity bene￿ts, whereas there are no productivity bene￿ts if the training occurred in
a multinational that was part of a di⁄erent industry. Thus, Gorg and Strobl￿ s evidence for
horizontal spillovers through labor turnover is stronger than that for inter-industry spillovers.
To summarize, there has been much progress in recent studies of technology spillovers
related to FDI. While few authors employing micro panel data have estimated positive
horizontal spillovers, a number of crucial issues have become clear. First, one must be able
to isolate spillovers from other e⁄ects, and second, the FDI data must track well changes
in foreign activity to avoid attenuation bias. One study arguably provides robust evidence
that inward FDI is causal in raising the productivity of domestic ￿rms in the same industry
(Keller and Yeaple 2009b). While it suggests that technology spillovers from FDI materialize
mainly in high-tech industries, they appear to be economically important, accounting for a
substantial fraction of ￿rms￿overall productivity growth.
There are now several papers which suggest that there may be technology spillovers from
vertical FDI. Future work should, ￿rst, con￿rm these results while employing credible ex-
ogenous variation in FDI, perhaps through instrumental variable estimation. Second, it will
be crucial to separate true technology spillovers from arms-length technology transactions,
linkage e⁄ects, and measurement spillovers associated with vertical FDI, because the case
for public policy intervention rests with the former, not the latter.
Taken together, there is now evidence that both horizontal and vertical spillovers as-
sociated with FDI are important. In the following section, I am turning to evidence for
41technology spillovers from outward FDI.
5.2 Outward Foreign Direct Investment Spillovers
While most of the work on FDI spillovers has focused on inward FDI, researchers have also
studied whether multinationals go abroad to acquire technological knowledge from other
￿rms. The leading example of this may be a foreign ￿rm locating an a¢ liate in the United
States￿Silicon Valley in order to ￿ source￿technology from the ￿rms in its environment.
There are some reasons to believe that this may be important. First of all, while for U.S.
multinational ￿rms around 85% of all R&D is conducted in the parent ￿rm, this fraction
is typically higher for foreign ￿rms that invest in the United States. The comparatively
high level of R&D of these countries￿a¢ liates in the U.S. is consistent with the idea that
they have to develop the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) to be able to reap
technology spillovers from local ￿rms.
Researchers have looked at the patent citations of these ￿rms to con￿rm the hypothe-
sis (Alameida 1996, Branstetter 2006). Alameida (1996) performs a treatment-and-control
group analysis of patent citations in the U.S. semi-conductor industry similar in spirit to
Ja⁄e, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), ￿nding that foreign ￿rms cite the patents of
other ￿rms in their geographic environment more strongly than the similar domestic ￿rms.
Branstetter (2006) examines the patent citation pattern of about 200 Japanese ￿rms for the
years 1980 to 1997. He ￿nds that Japanese ￿rms that have a relatively large number of
a¢ liates in the United States cite U.S. patents to a greater extent than Japanese ￿rms with
fewer a¢ liates located in the United States. This ￿nding is strongest for Japanese R&D
42and product development facilities in the US. While Branstetter (2006) does not model the
reason for the location decision of Japanese ￿rms, he controls for technological proximity,
which reduces endogeneity concerns.
Researchers have also provided evidence on technology sourcing through FDI in terms of
e⁄ects on ￿rm-level productivity growth (Gri¢ th, Harrison, and van Reenen 2005). These
authors show Figure 3:
U.S. R&D growth by industry over the period 1990-2000 against the productivity growth
premium of UK ￿rms, de￿ned as the growth of ￿rms with a strong versus a weak technological
presence in the United States. We see that the UK productivity growth premium tends to
be higher in industries for which US R&D has grown relatively strongly.30 As the measure
for technological presence, the authors compute for each UK ￿rm the fraction of its US
30The grey circles are industries in which the UK lag behind US productivity levels was particularly large
in 1990, and therefore there was ￿ the most to learn￿ .
43patent applications for which the lead inventor is located in the United States. This gives a
useful combination of using patent and productivity data to study international technology
di⁄usion. The evidence is consistent with the idea that outward FDI helps to bring foreign
technology into a country.
The following section discusses the evidence on international trade as a channel for tech-
nology spillovers.
6 International Trade
6.1 Evidence on Spillovers through Exporting
A major question is whether ￿rms receive technology spillovers through their exporting















Thus, a domestic ￿rm might through its exporting activity come into contact with foreign
technology. This raises the domestic ￿rm￿ s technological capacity, which in turn increases
the domestic ￿rm￿ s productivity. It turns out that there is typically no evidence on the
simultaneous presence of all four elements presented above.
There is anecdotal evidence however claiming that ￿rms do bene￿t from interacting with
foreign customer, for instance because the latter impose higher product quality standards
44than domestic customer, while at the same time providing information on how to meet the
higher standards. Case studies of the export success of a number of East Asian countries
starting in the 1960s are particularly strong in their emphasis on learning-by-exporting ef-
fects (Rhee, Ross-Larson, and Pursell 1984). The question is whether this evidence can be
supported with econometric evidence.
There is abundant evidence that in a given cross-section, exporters are on average more
productive than non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen 1999, Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998,
Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi, and Sokolo⁄ 2002). That does not settle the issue of causality
however: are exporting ￿rms more productive because of learning e⁄ects associated with
exporting, or is it rather the case that more ￿rms that are more productive to start out with
self-select into exporting? Currently there is more evidence in favor of selection, however,
a number of recent contributions have presented evidence that supports the learning-by-
exporting view as well.
While learning-by-exporting has been emphasized primarily for low- and middle-income
countries￿￿rms, there is in principle no reason why it is limited to these countries, especially
given the ￿rms￿heterogeneity in terms of productivity in any given country. Bernard and
Jensen (1999) study the learning-by-exporting question using data on U.S. ￿rms. This has
the advantage that the sample is relatively large and there is comparatively much experience
with data collection and preparation, which may result in lower measurement error.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) do not model export market participation explicitly. In-
stead, they study the performance of di⁄erent sets of ￿rms separately.31 Bernard and Jensen
31Four types of ￿rms can be distinguished: exporters, non-exporters, starters (plants that start exporting),
45estimate that labor productivity growth for exporters is about 0.8% higher than for non-
exporters.32 This estimate is fairly small, and it becomes even smaller (and insigni￿cant)
for longer time horizons. However, the estimate of 0.8% appears to be a downward biased
estimate of the learning-by-exporting e⁄ect because it comes from an analysis conditional on
plant survival. Bernard and Jensen show that conditional on size, exporters are 10% more
likely to survive than non-exporters.33 It is plausible that this 10% survival probability dif-
ference is indicative of higher productivity growth for exporters than non-exporters, because
plants tend to fail because their productivity growth is low. This suggests that the overall
di⁄erence in productivity growth between exporters and non-exporters may be larger than
0.8%.
The paper by Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) provides evidence on learning external-
ities from exporting using micro data from Columbia, Morocco, and Mexico. By estimating
simultaneously a dynamic discrete choice equation that determines export market partici-
pation, these authors take account that it is on average the already-productive ￿rms that
self-select into the export market. The export market participation decision is given by
yit =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :









j=1 (F 0 ￿ F j)yij￿j + ￿it
0 otherwise
(15)
and quitters (plants that stop exporting).
32Bernard and Jensen￿ s estimates using TFP instead of labor productivity are lower, but the labor pro-
ductivity ￿gures are preferred in this case. The TFP measure is a simple regression residual that is fallible
to a number of problems. Griliches and Mairesse (1998) provide a discussion of recent work on this.
33Size is the main predictor of survival in recent industry-equilibrium models (e.g. Olley and Pakes 1996),
because a small ￿rm might have to exit after only one bad shock, whereas a large ￿rm has substance enough
to weather a longer succession of bad shocks.
46and any learning from exporting e⁄ects are uncovered by simultaneously estimating an
autoregressive cost function
















jyit￿j + vit (16)
Here, yit is the export indicator of plant i in period t, Xit is a vector of exogenous plant
characteristics, et is the exchange rate, AV Cit are average costs, Kit is capital, and F 0 and
F j are sunk costs of export market participation.
The export equation states that one only sees a plant exporting if the pro￿ts from doing
so are greater than from not exporting (the latent threshold is expressed in terms of observ-
ables). The dynamic cost equation asks whether past exporting experience reduces current
cost (captured by the parameters ￿
y
j), conditional on past costs and size (proxied by capital).
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) show results for the three countries separately, and also
by major industry, using maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments estima-
tion. They also discuss results for each country separately, and also by major industry. In
general, they tend to show no signi￿cant e⁄ects from past exporting experience on current
performance. In fact, to the extent that Clerides et al.￿ s estimates are signi￿cant, they go
into the wrong direction (exporting raising costs). It would be surprising if indeed there
would be negative learning e⁄ects, and the authors give a number of plausible reasons of
why this ￿nding may have to be discounted. Another interpretation of the generally insignif-
icant estimates may be that the estimation framework is demanding too much of the data.
However, Clerides et al.￿ s descriptive plots of average cost before and after export market
47entry support their main result of no evidence for learning-by-exporting e⁄ects. Exporters
are more productive, but that is because they self-select themselves into the export market.
Some of these estimates come from a relatively small number of years, and there may be
an argument that this time horizon is too short to see major learning-by-exporting e⁄ects.
Alternatively, Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi, and Sokolo⁄ (2002) focus on the time before en-
tering the export market. These authors use data from ￿ve Southeast Asian countries to
show that ￿rms which eventually become exporters make more investments to raise produc-
tivity and the quality of their goods than ￿rms that plan to stay out of the export market.
This is plausible, but if these investments require￿ which is likely￿ real resources, those
need to be subtracted from any learning e⁄ects the ￿rms receive after they have entered the
export market.34 Moreover, given that the productivity increases pre-date the ￿rm￿ s entry
into the export market, at best these are indirect learning-by-exporting e⁄ects.
Using similar methods as Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), van Biesebroeck (2005)
has revisited the issue by studying productivity dynamics of ￿rms in nine African countries.
In contrast to Clerides et al., he estimates that starting to export boosts productivity by
about 25% for the average ￿rm in his sample. Van Biesebroeck (2005) also estimates that
the higher productivity growth of exporters versus non-exporters is sustained. By employing
instrumental-variable and semi-parametric techniques as alternative ways to deal with the
selection issue, van Biesebroeck￿ s analysis is more comprehensive than most. His analysis
generally supports the notion that exporting leads to the transfer of technological knowledge.
34This point is related to the fact that none of these estimates are claimed to be spillover e⁄ects; rather,
they are learning e⁄ects, which could be costly to acquire. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) do estimate
spillovers to other plants; the evidence on this is mixed.
48In trying to reconcile his ￿ndings with some of the earlier results, van Biesebroeck shows that
part of the di⁄erence in productivity growth between exporters and non-exporters appears
to be due to unexploited scale economies for the latter. This suggests that at least in part
his results are due to constraints imposed by demand, and not due to technology transfer in
the sense of an outward shift of the production possibility frontier at all levels of production.
Richer data is needed to make further progress on distinguishing these hypotheses.
De Loecker (2007) uses matched sampling techniques to analyze whether ￿rms that start
exporting become more productive, using micro data of Slovenian manufacturing ￿rms. Con-
trolling for self-selection into exporting, De Loecker ￿nds that export entrants indeed become
more productive once they start exporting, and that the productivity gap between exporters
and their domestic counterparts increases further over time.
In these papers, the evidence is primarily on elements (1) and (3) in the above diagram:
the authors observe productivity and whether a ￿rm exports or not. The analysis might be
considerably strengthened by including information on elements (2) and (4), namely on the
speci￿c channel through which a ￿rm￿ s domestic technological capabilities have bene￿ted
from foreign technology. Utar (2009) makes progress on this by examining the impact of
foreign technical service (FTS) purchases on the productivity of ￿rms that are starting to
export. The idea is that such foreign technical training and assistance or technological license
purchases may give ￿rms a better chance to access and absorb the foreign technology that
they encounter while exporting their product. Because these are purchases, it is clear that
they are not spillovers as such. At the same time, Utar provides evidence that learning
spillovers from exporting are correlated with FTS purchases.
49Overall, the econometric evidence for learning-from-exporting e⁄ects is mixed. The early
evidence strongly supported the selection view, although recently the evidence from ￿rm-level
studies has started to tilt in favor of learning-from-exporting. There are a number of issues
that still need to be addressed. First, there could be heterogeneity across industries mask-
ing strong but industry-speci￿c learning e⁄ects, especially with respect to high-technology
products.35 Second, the analysis could be improved if we knew more on both the export
destination and the exporter, instead of simply an indicator variable (exporting yes/no). For
instance, to which ￿rms, in which countries, do the exports go? Interestingly, in one study
where such information is available, De Loecker (2007), it is found that ￿rms that export to
high-income countries experience higher productivity gains than ￿rms that export to low-
income countries, consistent with technology spillovers. We need more work on these issues.
Moreover, it is still not clear under which circumstances there is learning from exporting,
and when there is none.
6.2 Evidence on Spillovers through Imports
In the model of section 2, a¢ liates import intermediate goods embodying the multinational
￿rm￿ s technology. This amounts to the di⁄usion of technological knowledge from one country
to another, within a given ￿rm. Technology spillovers result when other ￿rms learn about
the multinational￿ s technology. For example, host country ￿rms in the same industry as the
multinational a¢ liate might get acquainted with the characteristics of the imported good,
35Industry heterogeneity has recently been emphasized in the literature on inward FDI (see 5.1). However,
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) e.g. do not estimate major di⁄erences across industries.
50allowing them to create a similar technology at relatively low costs.
Evidence on technology spillovers through imports will ideally cover multiple elements,















Thus, foreign technological knowledge would augment the domestic technology stock by way
of imports, and that raises domestic productivity.
One strand of evidence has employed micro data to study the productivity consequences
of import liberalization. The seminal paper by Pavcnik (2002) studies the Chilean liber-
alizations of the late 1970s and early 1980s. She ￿nds that the productivity of plants in
industries that are most a⁄ected by import liberalization increases by more than that of
plants that are less a⁄ected by liberalization. Pavcnik interprets these within-plant produc-
tivity improvements primarily as reductions in X-ine¢ ciency, or that plants ￿ trim their fat￿ .
This would not involve technology spillovers. Amiti and Konings (2008) show using manu-
facturing census data for Indonesia that it is primarily the liberalization of input tari⁄s, not
output tari⁄s, that is behind the observed productivity gains. They argue that lower input
tari⁄s may lead to gains due to variety, quality, embodied technology, and learning. It will
be crucial to employ more information on technology￿ elements (2) and (4) in equation (17)￿
to make further progress on these questions.
Another strand of the literature has employed ￿rm-level data to study technology learning
51from imports through vertical links (Blalock and Veloso 2007). In analogy to vertical FDI
spillovers (see section 5.1 above), domestic ￿rms that supply a downstream industry in
which the share of imported inputs is relatively high may face a relatively high potential for
technology spillovers, perhaps because the downstream ￿rm provides relevant information
on the initially superior imported inputs at low or zero costs. Blalock and Veloso (2007)
show evidence consistent with this for the case of Indonesia. In order to go further, future
research in this vein should try to incorporate the technology channel directly, both in the
theory and in the empirical work. Research on international and inter-industry technology
spillovers at the industry level has found strong evidence for both, see Keller (2002b). An
important question is whether these results hold up at the micro level.
There is also evidence on technology di⁄usion through trade of intermediate, or equip-
ment, goods. In Eaton and Kortum (2002, 2001), the authors have combined the structure of
technology di⁄usion in Eaton and Kortum (1999) with the Ricardian model of trade due to
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). In Eaton and Kortum￿ s model, trade augments
a country￿ s consumption possibilities for the classic Ricardian reason: trade gives access
to foreign-produced goods or, implicitly, their production technologies. By specializing in
their respective comparative advantage goods, countries can gain from trade because given
a country￿ s resources, the value of output with trade is higher than without trade. There
are no spillovers in this model. Importers pay the competitive price and importing has no
e⁄ect on innovation. However, importing may raise the probability that technology spillovers
materialize.
Eaton and Kortum (2001) assume that unit transport costs are increasing in geographic
52distance. This implies that the price of equipment goods in remote countries is relatively
high, or, equivalently, that productivity in these countries is relatively low. These e⁄ects
are shown to be quantitatively important, as di⁄erences in the relative price of equipment
account for 25% of the cross-country productivity di⁄erences in a sample of 34 countries
(Eaton and Kortum 2001). However, according to Eaton and Kortum￿ s model, equipment
goods prices are relatively low in rich countries, whereas the price data reported by Summers
and Heston￿ s International Comparison Program shows that equipment prices are relatively
high in rich countries.36 This suggests that other mechanisms are also important.
There is also evidence on the importance of imports that comes from international R&D
spillover regressions. Coe and Helpman (1995) relate total factor productivity to domestic
(Sct) and foreign R&D in year t,










c0 mc0cSct. A positive e⁄ect from the foreign R&D variable would imply that
a country￿ s productivity is increasing in the extent to which it imports from high- as opposed
to low-R&D countries. This would support the hypothesis that imports are a channel of
technology di⁄usion along the lines of the trade-and-growth models discussed in Grossman
and Helpman (1991). In a sample with 22 OECD countries, Coe and Helpman (1995)
estimate a positive and quantitatively large e⁄ect from import-weighted foreign R&D. Similar
36See Eaton and Kortum (2001)￿ s Figure 7 and CIC (2003), respectively.
53e⁄ects are found for technology di⁄usion from highly industrialized to 77 less developed
countries (Coe, Helpman and Ho⁄maister 1997).
There are some reasons to remain skeptical here. First, the analysis of Keller (1998) has
shown that the import shares in the construction of the foreign R&D variable S
f
ct are not, in
fact, essential to obtain Coe and Helpman￿ s (1995) results. Speci￿cally, Keller (1998) uses
randomly created shares, denoted by ￿c0c, in place of the actual bilateral import shares to




c0 ￿c0cSct . Using this alternative
foreign R&D variable yields similarly high coe¢ cients and levels of explained variation as
the regressions using the observed bilateral import shares. Given that import shares are not
essential for Coe and Helpman￿ s (1995) results, their analysis does not allow to draw strong
conclusions regarding the importance of imports as a vehicle for di⁄usion.37
A number of authors have made progress by examining the international R&D spillover
regressions further. Xu and Wang (1999) emphasize that technology di⁄usion in recent trade
and growth models is associated speci￿cally with di⁄erentiated capital goods trade. This is
in contrast to the trade data Coe and Helpman (1995) use to construct their import shares
(which come from overall trade). Xu and Wang (1999) show that this distinction matters:
the capital goods-foreign R&D variable accounts for about 10% more of the variation in
productivity than does Coe and Helpman￿ s analysis, and it also performs better than Keller￿ s
(1998) counterfactual variable.
Moreover, it has been noted that the foreign R&D variable captures only current-period
37Alternatively, Keller (1998) sets all ￿c0c equal to 1, which produces similar results. This con￿rms that
the import shares do not matter for the results, whether or not they are truly random (see Keller 1997b,
2000, and Coe and Ho⁄maister 1999).
54bilateral trade; it is clearly possible though that country A bene￿ts from country C￿ s tech-
nology without importing from this source, if country C exports to country B, which in turn
exports to country A. Lumenga-Neso, Olarreaga, and Schi⁄ (2005) use a speci￿cation that
captures such indirect R&D spillovers, and show that it performs better than Coe and Help-
man￿ s (1995) and Keller￿ s (1998) models. These results are consistent with the importance
of dynamic e⁄ects from imports, but more research in an explicitly dynamic framework is
needed to learn more about this.
The analysis by Acharya and Keller (2008a) extends the international R&D spillover
literature in a number of dimensions. First, it encompasses more countries and a longer
sample period of 30 years, and perhaps most importantly, it allows isolating major high-
technology sectors￿ computers, information and communication technology￿that were the
drivers of recent economy-wide productivity growth. Second, on the econometric side, they
employ instrumental-variable and control-function approaches to estimate causal e⁄ects as
opposed to correlations. Acharya and Keller (2008a) move away from the import-share
weighted variable Sf; instead, they relate industry TFP in a sample of high-income countries
to both the R&D in six large OECD countries38 and bilateral imports from these six OECD
countries:






￿cs (~ mcsit ￿ lnSst)+
X
s￿G6
￿s ~ mcsit +"cit (18)
where ~ mcsit is the import share of country c from one of the six large OECD, or G-6, countries,
38These are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the United States.
55s. Thus, equation (18) introduces the R&D of each of the G-6 countries separately, allowing
for varying R&D elasticities. In addition, the speci￿cation includes the R&D-import share
interaction as well as imports as separate variables, while the control variables X are ￿xed
e⁄ects.
The results indicate that international technology di⁄usion has both important compo-
nents that are related to imports and others that are not related to imports, which are
separately identi￿ed in (18) by the parameters ￿ and ￿; respectively. The relative magni-
tude of the two parameters gives information on the relative importance of imports-related
technology di⁄usion. For example, Acharya and Keller (2008a) show that the majority of
all technology transfer from the US and the UK occurs through imports, whereas Germany
and Japan transfer technology abroad primarily through non-trade channels.
The estimates also provide evidence for heterogeneity in international technology dif-
fusion. For example, the impact of US R&D on UK productivity is twice as large as the
US e⁄ect in Germany or Spain. They also ￿nd that some countries bene￿t more from for-
eign technology than other countries across the board. Canada, for example, bene￿ts about
50% more from Japanese R&D and 33% more from French R&D than the average country,
suggesting that Canada has a relatively high absorptive capacity for bene￿ting from inter-
national technology spillovers. Coe, Helpman, and Ho⁄maister (2008) also provide evidence
on heterogeneity in international R&D spillovers by showing that they are stronger in the
presence of the following institutions: doing business requires few permits, a high quality
of tertiary education, strong intellectual property rights protection, and a particular origin
of the legal system. These authors also ￿nd that ￿nancial development, labor market in-
56stitutions, governance, and ease of trade across borders do not matter for the strength of
international R&D spillovers.
Madsen (2007) employs information on domestic patent applications instead of R&D to
construct the foreign knowledge stocks using bilateral import share weights. Because patent
data is available since the late 19th century, this allows for a considerably extended sample
period. The long sample period is helpful because it increases the statistical power of the
tests employed in his cointegration framework. His results are broadly supportive of the
hypothesis that imports contribute to the international transmission of foreign technology.
The importance of imports for technology di⁄usion has also been assessed with patent
citation data. Sj￿holm (1996) studies citations in patent applications of Swedish ￿rms to
patents owned by foreign inventors. Controlling for a number of other correlates and also
conducting an extreme-bounds analysis, Sj￿holm ￿nds a positive correlation between Swedish
patent citations and bilateral imports. Another study by MacGarvie (2006) looks at patent
citations of a large sample of French ￿rms. She ￿nds that French ￿rms which import from
another country j cite country j patents more than French ￿rms that do not, by about 40%
relative to their pre-importing citation behavior. Moreover, foreign ￿rms in country j also
cite relatively strongly the patents of French ￿rms that import from country j. Interestingly,
the same is not true for exports. MacGarvie￿ s results are robust to employing both regressions
(count data) models as well as matching estimators. The results support the idea that
imports contribute to international technology spillovers.
How sure can we be of quantitative results? If a ￿rm￿ s propensity to cite foreign tech-
nology from some country and its propensity to import from that country are positively
57correlated, it would be reasonable to expect a lower increase in citations for a randomly cho-
sen new importer. Instrumental-variable estimation is one way to address these concerns.
Summarizing, the evidence points to a signi￿cant role for important in international
technology di⁄usion. We now turn to some concluding observations.
587 Conclusions
How can the theory laid out in section 2 be used to think about the ￿ndings that were just
discussed? First, there is the ￿nding of geographic localization of international technology
di⁄usion. This seemingly puzzling result￿ after all, is technological knowledge not weightless,
after all?￿ is easily explained if one considers the transactions costs of international commerce
more broadly.39 Yes, there are trade costs for shipping technology in embodied form, but it
is also costly to communicate disembodied technological knowledge, especially if it cannot
be done face-to-face. As ￿rms equate trade and technology transfer costs at the margin,
technology transfer falls with the distance between technology sender and recipient, even
though technological knowledge is weightless. Technology di⁄usion declines with distance
because in equilibrium technology transfer to remote locations is relatively costly, so there
is less of it.
Moreover, in the model above multinational a¢ liates import intermediate goods from
their parent while at the same time they produce other inputs locally. The evidence for
technology spillovers associated with inward FDI discussed above is at least as strong, and
may be stronger than the evidence for spillovers from importing. Thus it appears that
technology learning externalities are enhanced by the physical presence of the a¢ liate plant,
perhaps through labor turnover. Even taking account of the fact that around half of all
world trade is between una¢ liated parties, technology embodied in intermediate goods may
not be as accessible, and consequently technology spillovers may be lower.40 As we have
39In a weightless economy, intangible goods and in particular knowledge play the dominant role; see Quah
(1999).
40There may of course be large productivity bene￿ts from new intermediate goods, but only a fraction of
59seen there is also evidence consistent with technology externalities from outward FDI. With
regards to learning bene￿ts from exporting activity, there is currently no consensus although
recent evidence suggests export spillovers exist at least in speci￿c circumstances.41
A perennial problem remains the appropriate measurement of technology spillovers. First
of all, any costly investment has to be netted out before computing the spillover bene￿ts.
Second, it is very di¢ cult to identify technology spillovers without information on technology
indicators, as is the case for example when considering the relation between productivity
and FDI or imports. Observing data on technological capabilities obviously strengthens the
analysis, however, another issue is that productivity is often di¢ cult to measure. Because
of that it may be tempting to focus on evidence of technological knowledge transfers. This
could be done by observing an increase in patent citations or other measures, for example
the ￿nding that an increase in imports raises the product variety of domestic ￿rms. At the
same time, without linking these variables to productivity, the results stop short of being an
analysis of economic welfare.
We have seen that important ￿ndings can result from a number of di⁄erent empirical
methods. It is often di¢ cult to move from showing a correlation to establishing a causal
e⁄ect. Nevertheless it is important. Researchers might also specify a model, choosing pa-
rameters to match certain data moments, and then simulate it. Such counterfactuals can
these will be externalities.
41The model of section 2 is not very well suited to explain these ￿ndings, mostly because, as is the case
in almost all theory on multinational ￿rms, all technology is generated in the headquarters of the ￿rm (the
parent). This assumption ￿ts well the case of US multinational ￿rms, where around 85% of all R&D is done
by the parents; for multinational ￿rms of other countries, we know much less. However, one may conjecture
that parents do most of the R&D in multinationals from virtually any country.
60help to develop intuition that may be otherwise unattainable. At the same time, it is often
a challenge to agree on the relevant data moments that should be targeted, especially given
that technology spillovers are hard to identify. It is di¢ cult to believe that one can dispense
with the necessity of establishing causality using regression techniques.
There are a number of issues that this chapter has not addressed very much, mostly
because work in these areas is still in its infancy. For one, the trade model of Melitz (2003)
explains aggregate productivity changes through market share reallocation among ￿rms with
heterogeneous but ￿xed ￿rm e¢ ciency (or productivity). While this framework rules out
within-￿rm productivity changes, and hence technology spillovers, future work may be able
to analyze productivity changes due to within- and between-￿rm e⁄ects at the same time;
some initial empirical results suggest that both are important (Acharya and Keller 2008b).
Second, ￿rms that are heterogeneous in terms of e¢ ciency react di⁄erently to changes
in the degree of competition (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th, and Howitt 2005, Iacov-
one, Javorcik, Keller and Tybout 2009). As discussed above, changes in the competitive
environment may make it di¢ cult to isolate technology spillovers. If there are predictions
on which ￿rm will be more a⁄ected and which ￿rm less, however, this should be helpful in
making further progress on estimating technology spillovers. Finally, an important question
is whether one should think about technology spillovers as a⁄ecting production e¢ ciency, or
also a⁄ecting marketing and catering to consumer taste.42
In recent years we have witnessed a lot of important work on international technology
42See, e.g., Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008)￿ s work on selection on productivity versus
pro￿tability.
61di⁄usion, and the areas just mentioned may well be among the exciting research areas where
major progress is going to take place in the years ahead.
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